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NOTES
The Higher-Cost Problem: How the
CASE Act Addresses the History of
Inequity in the American Copyright
Regime
MICHAEL NEWELL*
The legislative history of copyright law in the United States
and its judicial interpretation resulted in a complex web of
statutes and doctrine theoretically meant to further the constitutional goal of “promot[ing] the Progress of Science and
the useful Arts.” But because of its complexity, enforcing
rights against infringers in federal court became prohibitively expensive for most. The American copyright regime
simultaneously allowed the music industry to unfairly profit
from the creativity of the under-resourced—particularly,
musicians of color.
This Note discusses the disparate impact of the American
copyright regime. Then, the Note discusses the Copyright Alternatives in the Small-Claims Enforcement Act, which Congress passed to address the high costs of pursuing copyright
infringement claims in federal court. Specifically, this Note
addresses constitutional and practical concerns raised by
scholars about the Act and how the Act might finally signal
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INTRODUCTION
Black musicians invented the genres that later defined popular
music in America, from blues, jazz, and soul to rock and roll, rap,
and hip-hop.1 Yet, since the 1920s, American musicians of color
have faced an uphill battle to reap the benefits of their own creativity. The music industry used ethically dubious or outright objection-

1

K.J. Greene, Copyright, Culture & (and) Black Music; A Legacy of Unequal Protection, 21 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L. J. 339, 364 (1998).
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able methods to exploit their works and appropriate their copyrights.2 Even when Black composers retained intellectual property
rights, the relatively high cost of protecting their interests in court
inhibited enforcement efforts.3 Recently, Congress legislatively recognized that the high cost of copyright litigation adversely affects
independent artists who cannot afford to bring infringement claims
in federal court. In response, Congress enacted the Copyright Alternative in Small-Claims Enforcement Act (“CASE Act”), signed into
law on December 27, 2020.4 One of the most significant, albeit undernoted, consequences of the CASE Act regime is that it offers a
belated opportunity to address some of the historic wrongs suffered
by African American musicians in the exploitation of their musical
works.5
The CASE Act aims to offer a remedy for creators of artistic
works who otherwise cannot afford to have their copyright claims
heard in court due to the high litigation costs inherent in the federal
court system.6 A welcome concept, the CASE Act establishes a Copyright Claims Board (“CCB”) at the Copyright Office in Washington, D.C. and grants it limited authority to render nonprecedential
determinations on copyright claims, award monetary damages, and
request that the infringing party cease its infringing activity.7 The
Act provides a low-cost alternative to filing in federal court by,
among other things, controlling a tightly circumscribed discovery

2

See discussion infra Section I.B; Robert Brauneis, Copyright, Music, and
Race: The Case of Mirror Cover Recordings, 1, 8–9 (May 2, 2020) GWU Legal
Studies Research Paper No. 2020-56, http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3591113 (describing process where recording studios and radio stations used the compulsory
license scheme to take advantage of their relatively small distribution channels
and rerecord their songs with white artists to distribute nationwide); K.J. Greene,
supra note 1, at 372–73 (describing process where artist would sell his composition to a record company or the artist’s manager for absurdly small sums).
3
See discussion infra Section I.A.
4
H.R. REP. NO. 116-252, at 16 (2019).
5
See discussion infra Section II.A. Injustices toward people of color or other
minority groups seemed to play no role in designing a solution to the high-cost
problem.
6
H.R. REP. NO. 116-252, supra note 4, at 16.
7
Copyright Alternative in Small-Claims Enforcement Act, 17 U.S.C.
§§ 1502–1504.
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process,8 encouraging settlement,9 and capping damages at
$30,000.10
Scholars have raised questions about the constitutionality of the
CASE Act with respect to its encroachment on Article III adjudication and the opt-out procedure.11 Especially with some minimal
amendments, however, the CASE Act regime will likely pass legal
muster. Indeed, despite its limitations, the CASE Act represents a
positive step toward empowering individual creators to enforce existing rights for which they did not previously have realistic remedies. By facilitating lower-cost access to a copyright tribunal and
promoting copyright literacy among artists, the CASE Act offers
tools effectively reserved until now for established corporate copyright owners with the resources to litigate and the ability to intimidate infringers. And importantly, despite Congress’s failure to consider how a small-claims tribunal might affect creators of color, one
of the most significant benefits of the CASE Act approach is that it
may help ameliorate the inequitable treatment of African American
artists in the copyright regime thus far.
The argument in this Note proceeds as follows. Part I provides
an overview of the potential relief associated with the CASE Act.
Part I of this Note offers an explanation for the expanding gap between copyright holders’ rights and their remedies and discusses
how copyright law particularly disadvantaged musicians of color.
Part II discusses the details of the CASE Act, its background, and
its legislative history. Part III sketches and assesses the principal
scholarly criticisms of the Act. Part IV argues that the CASE Act, in
combination with the Music Modernization Act, will bolster independent music artists’ incentive to create and will increase copyright
literacy among under-resourced groups. Regardless of its limitations, Part IV argues, the CASE Act represents a desirable legislative step in equalizing the access to copyright remedies of individual
artists and, particularly, of African American creators.

8
9
10
11

§ 1506(n).
§ 1503(a)(1)(F); § 1506(r).
§ 1504(e)(1)(D).
See discussion infra Sections III.A, III.B.
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A HISTORY OF COMPROMISE AND APPROPRIATION

A.
“Right Without a Remedy”
The Constitution vests Congress with the power “[t]o promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries” (“IP Clause”).12 Acutely aware of
the dangers of monopolies generally, the Founders intuited that
these monopolies to authors and inventors were justified by the public good they could produce.13 Even Thomas Jefferson, who wished
to remove this grant of exclusive monopolies, later acknowledged
the right of the country to have such a system “as an encouragement
to men to pursue ideas which may produce utility . . . .”14 Indeed,
with the industrial revolution beginning in Great Britain, the Founders undoubtedly sought to create a form of government that would
similarly incentivize American economic growth.15 The “limited
Times” language aimed to quell the fear and aversion of perpetual
monopolies, which were, in James Madison’s view, “justly classed
among the greatest nusances [sic] in Government.”16 Modern courts
and scholars routinely acknowledge the utilitarian basis of the IP
Clause.17
12

U.S. CONST. Art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
EDWARD C. WALTERSCHEID, THE NATURE OF THE INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY CLAUSE: A STUDY IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 6–7 (2002).
14
Id. at 6, 9 (quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug.
13, 1813), in XIII THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON at 334 (Andrew A. Lipscomb et al. eds., 1904)).
15
Id. at 93–94.
16
Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788) in, I THE
REPUBLIC OF LETTERS, at 566 (James Morton Smith ed., 1995).
17
See, e.g., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (“The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights
is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the
best way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in
‘Science and useful Arts.’”); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,
464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) (“[T]he limited grant is a means by which an important
public purpose may be achieved. It is intended to motivate the creative activity of
authors and inventors by the provision of a special reward, and to allow the public
access to the products of their genius after the limited period of exclusive control
has expired.”); W. Michael Schuster, Public Choice Theory, the Constitution, and
13
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However, the history of legislation in copyright and the judicial
interpretation of that legislation led to a complex regime that has
become increasingly expensive to enforce. Some scholars argue that
the American copyright regime strayed from the Founders’ original
intent as lobbying interest groups pushed Congress toward compromises.18 Technological advances led to confusion in court decisions,19 and social and cultural development led copyright industries
to effectively shut out an entire class of Americans from the benefits
of copyright.20
The Librarian of Congress in 1903 reported that the copyright
system at that time “[was] a highly technical one, largely due to its
uneven development by means of many separate enactments dealing
with particular matters, or framed to meet special exigencies.”21 He
also observed that whether a work enjoyed the protections of copyright depended not on equitable grounds but on “exact compliance
with statutory formalities.”22 To reconfigure the contradictions, discrepancies, and rigidity of the complex copyright laws of the day,
the Librarian of Congress held a conference with representatives of
copyright stakeholders and constructed a bill for Congress to consider; joint hearings in Congress commenced soon thereafter.23 Ul-

Public Understanding of the Copyright System, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 2247,
2253 (2018) (“The United States’ copyright system is a utilitarian regime intended
to benefit the public by expanding the scope of knowledge and culture. To this
end, encouraging creation of new works of authorship is the historically recognized goal of copyright law. This narrow target is mandated by a unique constitutional grant of congressional power, which identifies a policy goal to be attained . . . and the manner to achieve this end . . . .”).
18
See, e.g., Jessica D. Litman, Copyright Compromise and Legislative History, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 857, 902–03 (1987) (arguing that courts dismantled the
delicate industry compromises reflected in the 1976 Copyright Act); Schuster, supra note 17, at 2265 (arguing that the over-representation of special interest
groups has caused copyright law to expand into the realm of unconstitutionality).
19
See Jessica D. Litman, Copyright Legislation and Technological Change,
68 OR. L. REV. 275, 315–16 (1989).
20
See discussion infra Section I.B.
21
Report of the Librarian of Congress for the Fiscal Year Ending June 30,
1903, S. Doc. No. 10, 58th Cong., 2d Sess. 68–69 (1903).
22
Id.
23
Litman, supra note 19, at 284–85.
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timately, industry complaints and splintering congressional minorities at the hearings produced four competing versions of the bill,
which led the Chairman of the House Committee to urge the competing industries to convene and agree on a compromise solution.24
Thus, the legislative process that ultimately resulted in the Copyright Act of 1909 (“1909 Act”) was essentially a series of negotiations among representatives of industries with interests in copyright
whose avowed purpose was to draft legislation that provided for the
future.25 But some newly emerging industries had little negotiating
power and played no part in the drafting, so the industry-specific
drafting quickly became less than useful.26
As the 1909 Act aged, its provisions became increasingly remote
with respect to innovation and new technology.27 Common-law interpretation began to fill the gaps where the statute was silent.28 Judicial decisions became inconsistent, distinctions between cases became indefensible.29 Despite an amendment in 1912,30 the increasingly influential radio and motion picture industries quickly grew
uncomfortable with the 1909 Act, which was written without attention to their needs.31 The American Society of Composers, Authors
and Publishers (“ASCAP”) began demanding royalty payments
from those industries because they used popular music in their programs, hatching a decades-long embittered battle between the industries to revise the law once again, which lasted until the United
States’ intervention in World War II.32 In the meantime, lawyers
24

Id. at 285–87.
Id. at 277.
26
See id. at 291–99 (discussing the push for amendments to the 1909 Act by
ASCAP and the motion picture industry and hearings before the House Patent
Committee, where witnesses testified in 1925 that the existing copyright law was
inadequate and needed revision).
27
See id. at 302–03.
28
Litman, supra note 18, at 858.
29
Id.
30
The Townsend Amendment, passed in May of 1912, was the first time the
copyright laws provided protection for “motion pictures.” Wendy A. Maloney,
1912 Amendment Adds Movies to Copyright Law, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE (Mar.
2012),
https://www.copyright.gov/history/lore/pdfs/201203%20CLore_March2012.pdf.
31
See Litman, supra note 19, at 291.
32
See id. at 291–99.
25
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surveyed by the Copyright Office observed that the attorney’s fees
provisions in the 1909 Act rarely sufficed for the time and energy—
read, costs of litigation—expended in prosecuting or defending copyright infringement.33
Scholars like W. Michael Schuster and others suggest that any
congressional legislation granting monopoly-like protections pursuant to the IP Clause must “attempt to secure a countervailing benefit
to the public.”34 Yet, despite Congress’s attempt, these scholars argue that the 1909 Act “falls short of the constitutional requirement
of ‘promoting the progress’” because the creative output of authors
hardly increased at all in the years following the 1909 Act.35 The
1909 Act also failed to promote fairness or American equality.36
The 1976 Act—today’s operative copyright law—has similarly
been described as “a series of interrelated and dependent compromises among industries with differing interests in copyright.”37
Competing interests’ relentless insistence on conditional exemptions and privileges ultimately resulted in a complex web of rights
inundated with fact-specific carve-outs for particular, industry-specific uses.38 Much like the 1909 Act, quickly changing technology
exacerbated the high-cost problem as courts encountered difficulties
squaring the bargained-for provisions of the 1976 Act in new contexts.39 For example, in the 1976 Act’s first decade, cases involving
newly invented videocassette recorders, communications satellites,
and online databases often required courts to stretch the application

33

STAFF OF S. SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS OF
THE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION STUDIES
85 (Comm. Print 1960).
34
Schuster, supra note 17, at 2264 (quoting Paul J. Heald & Suzanna Sherry,
Implied Limits on the Legislative Power: The Intellectual Property Clause as an
Absolute Constraint on Congress, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 1119, 1120 (2000)).
35
Id. at 2266.
36
See discussion infra Section I.B.
37
Litman, supra note 18, at 862.
38
See Litman, supra note 19, at 320.
39
See id. at 315.
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of the fair use doctrine40 and draw analogies that broadened technology-specific language.41 Since then, technology has continued to require courts to stretch the meaning of fair use, and future development of technology will implicate copyright in ways we cannot foresee today. For litigants, dealing with a new or developing technology means hiring expensive expert witnesses to convince the court
to apply old-technology-specific copyright law in their favor.42 So,
while the copyright laws technically apply equally to all, the cost
required to navigate the complexity and uncertainty of the copyright
regime effectively precludes most individual creators from enforcement in court.43 The CASE Act now provides a limited pathway for
40

See id. at 349 (discussing Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios,
464 U.S. 417 (1984)).
41
See id. at 343 n.378 (citing circuit decisions that concluded that communications satellites operating as common carriers were entitled to passive carrier
exemption in 17 U.S.C. § 111(a)(3)).
42
For example, the 1976 Act’s negotiated definition of “fair use,” Litman,
supra note 18, at 869, led courts to consider normative arguments about what
kinds of uses a “reasonable copyright owner” would allow, see, e.g., Harper &
Row Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 550 (1985), which incentivized
parties to hire experts that inform the court on reasonableness and customariness
to increase the likelihood that a court would rule in their favor. Experts are routinely used in copyright infringement cases for other purposes as well, such as
demonstrating copyrightability, copying in fact, and calculating damages.
While section 505 of the Copyright Act allows recovery of “full costs” by
or against the other party, subject to the court’s discretion, 17 U.S.C. § 505, a
recent decision by the Supreme Court interpreted the phrase “full costs” to include
only those costs which fall under six categories of expenses that qualify as “costs”
according to sections 1821 and 1920 of title 28 of the United States Code. Rimini
Street, Inc. v. Oracle USA, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 873, 875 (2019). Expenses for partyhired experts do not qualify. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1821, 1920; Arlington Cent. Sch.
Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 297 (2006) (“‘[C]osts’ is a term of
art that generally does not include expert fees.”). Therefore, the party that hires
the expert can expect to bear the expense—even if a judge decides to award costs
pursuant to section 505.
43
Take the 2018 testimony of commercial photographer Jenna Close, for example. Speaking before the House Committee on the Judiciary in support of the
CASE Act, Ms. Close testified that she regularly finds her works infringed both
online and in print and illegally used by her paying clients’ competitors. Copyright
Alternative in Small-Claims Enforcement Act of 2017: Hearing Before the Comm.
on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. 9–10 (2018) (statement of Jenna Close, Dir. of Photography, Buck the Cubicle) (testifying that an internet search revealed eighteen
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small copyright claims44 but, if Congress decides to take another
look at the 1976 Act, Congress should consider the extent to which
technology-specific, rigid copyright legislation increases the cost of
litigating a copyright claim.
B.

The Disparate Impact of Copyright Laws on Musicians of
Color
Historically, the appropriation of creative works by a whitedominated copyright industry, endemic American racism, copyright
law itself, and the unequal bargaining power between musicians and
music labels has particularly disadvantaged musicians of color.45
For example, America’s most profitable form of entertainment in
the 1800s, minstrelsy, would not have existed but for the appropriation of African American culture for racist ends.46 And, while the
large companies using her photos without permission) [hereinafter 2018 Hearing].
Her business brings in between $60,000 and $100,000 a year, which she uses to
pay salaries and other expenses to maintain her business. Id. at 10. She testified
that she cannot pursue legal action against those infringers because it would bankrupt her. Id. at 19.
David Trust, chief executive officer of the Professional Photographers of
America, also present at the 2018 hearing, testified that ninety percent of artists
said they had been infringed multiple times over the last five years, yet do not
seek redress in federal court because they would have to stop operating their businesses to do so. Id. at 20 (statement of David Trust, Chief Exec. Officer, Pro.
Photographers of Am.).
The American Intellectual Property Law Association calculated that the
median cost of a copyright infringement suit with less than $1 million at risk in
2010 was approximately $200,000 through discovery and $350,000 through to
appeal. AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW ASSOCIATION (“AIPLA”),
REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 2011, 35 (2011).
44
See discussion infra Section II.
45
See, e.g., Greene, supra note 1, at 372–73 (discussing four patterns that
resulted in inadequate intellectual property protection for Black music artists).
46
K.J. Greene, Intellectual Property at the Intersection of Race and Gender:
Lady Sings the Blues, 16 J. GENDER, SOC. POL’Y & LAW 365, 372 (2008). Minstrelsy was a form of entertainment where white actors in black face would perform song, dance, and comic routines based on stereotyped depictions of Black
Americans. “The minstrel show was central to American culture from the 1830s
to the 1870s, so much so that it is ‘difficult for us now to realize how all-pervasive
and influential the minstrel show was.’” Id. at 372 n.40 (quoting TERRY WALDO,
THIS IS RAGTIME 12 (1976)). For a brief history of minstrelsy in the United States,
see Tamara Lissette Brown, So You Think You Can Dance: Black Dance and
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1909 Act consolidated the patchwork of copyright laws enacted
throughout the 1900s, many of the formalities to registration and renewal of copyright remained in place.47 Just like before the 1909
Act was passed, Black artists unfamiliar with the legal requirements
often found their works injected into the public domain to be used
freely by anyone.48 Further, a work enjoyed federal copyright protection under the 1909 Act only when published with proper notice
and promptly registered.49 While these formalities disadvantaged
unknowing artists of all backgrounds,50 professor K.J. Greene recognized a pattern by which managers took advantage of musicians
of color by registering a work with the Copyright Office as their
own, which deprived those artists of the fruits of their labor.51
Relatedly, musicians of color also received less protection for
their musical works due to inequalities of bargaining power.52 They
were “routinely swindled out of their publishing rights and underpaid for record sales” due to diminished access to resources and

American Popular Culture, in SOUL THIEVES: THE APPROPRIATION AND
MISREPRESENTATION OF AFRICAN AMERICAN POPULAR CULTURE, 201, 208–16
(Tamara Lissette Brown & Baruti N. Kopano, eds., 2014).
47
See K.J. Greene, “Copynorms,” Black Cultural Production, and the Debate Over African-American Reparations, 25 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1175,
1202 (2008).
48
See Greene, supra note 1, at 354. Professor Greene notes that this phenomenon also frequently occurred to indigenous peoples worldwide. Id. at 354 n.68.
49
See discussion supra Section I.A. Until the 1976 Act passed, federal law
protected published works and state common law governed unpublished works.
While it seems at first glance that all grounds are covered, a non-federally protected work could have been copied virtually without consequence in any state
that has no personal jurisdiction over the copier.
50
See Jane C. Ginsburg, The U.S. Experience with Mandatory Copyright
Formalities: A Love/Hate Relationship, 33 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 311, 330 (2010).
51
See, e.g., Greene, supra note 1, at 353–54, 372 (describing Merchant v.
Levy, No. 87 Civ. 7199, 1995 WL 217508, at *1 (S.D.N.Y 1993), in which a
manager registered copyright only in his and lead singer’s name when two other
Black artists co-wrote the song, but were not entitled to full recovery due to statute
of limitations).
52
See id. at 356. For a discussion of unconscionable contracts in the music
industry, see Tamera H. Bennett, Risky Business: Rejecting Adherence to Industry
Standards in Exclusive Songwriter Agreements, 4 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 71,
81–83 (1997).
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knowledge.53 For example, take the case of Bessie Smith, the “Empress of the Blues.”54 Bessie Smith’s heirs brought a lawsuit in 1979
alleging, among other things, that Columbia Records took advantage
of her illiteracy and lack of sophistication in business affairs.55
While her contracts with Columbia paid a flat fee of $200 for each
recording and paid no royalties, the label simultaneously signed
white performers to contracts with much greater sums and included
royalty provisions.56 The heirs alleged that any contracts in writing
were null and void because (1) Smith’s reported agents did not protect her interests because they worked as officers or employees for
Columbia Records; (2) any contracts executed with Smith’s authorization were executed upon the advice of persons working for Columbia Records and had a direct conflict of interest; or (3) the contracts were unconscionable.57 The court specifically rejected the argument that the statute of limitations could be tolled by a fraud exception; it would not consider that Smith’s lack of business sophistication could conceal the fraudulent activity for more than forty
years.58 According to the Gee v. CBS, Inc. court, “if Bessie Smith
were indeed the copyright holder, she knew, or Should [sic] have
known, that certain legal rights, including the rights of licensing,
were hers by virtue of those copyrights.”59
The Smiths’ case is a window to the past practice of record companies regularly appropriating the creativity of Black artists and
profiting from it. The Gee court in 1979 refused to consider that the
creators of blues music, like Bessie Smith, did not have the literacy,
savvy, legal representation, or the wherewithal to navigate the complexities of the 1909 Act.60 Copyright owners were assumed to
know and follow the complexities of the 1909 Act,61 but most Black

53

Brauneis, supra note 2, at 24.
Gee v. CBS, Inc., 471 F. Supp. 600, 600 (E.D. Pa. 1979), aff’d 612 F.2d
572 (3d Cir. 1979).
55
Id. at 611.
56
Id. at 611, 613.
57
Id. at 640–41.
58
Id. at 626.
59
Id.
60
Greene, supra note 47, at 1202.
61
Gee, 471 F. Supp. at 626.
54
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artists in the racially segregated American society of the early-twentieth century simply did not and could not.62
The 1909 Act also vested copyright owners of musical works
with the exclusive right to the “mechanical” rendering of their works
and facilitated a compulsory license scheme.63 These provisions
gave the owner of a copyright in a musical work the exclusive right
to make the first sound recording of the work, the right to refuse to
license the work to others, to demand any royalty rate, or to place
conditions on the ability of others to record the song.64 But once the
artist licensed the first recording, anyone could make another recording of that musical work so long as they paid the statutory fee,
which from 1909 through 1978, was two cents for every record
sold.65
Although drafted to address concerns of the player-piano market, the 1909 Act’s compulsory license scheme permitted another
exploitation of African American creativity.66 In racially divided
markets, a widespread practice developed of employing a white artist to rerecord songs written by musicians of color, referred to as
“mirror cover recordings.”67 This practice allowed big record companies to flood the relatively localized distribution channel of the
company that originally recorded the song and distribute the rerecorded song nationwide.68 This scheme was exceptionally profitable for music labels throughout most of the twentieth century be-

See Greene, supra note 47, at 1202 (“The court in the Bessie Smith case
assumed that artists would know the law, but imputing knowledge of complex law
is just another form of white domination given the state of Black education and
legal representation in the 1920’s.”).
63
An Act to Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, § 1(e)
(1909) (amended 1912).
64
Brauneis, supra note 2, at 3.
65
Id. at 3–4. While two cents in 1909 is the equivalent of about sixty-five
cents today, two cents in 1978 is worth only nine cents today. See U.S. BUREAU
OF LAB. STAT., CPI Inflation Calculator, https://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm (last visited Aug. 28, 2022).
66
Brauneis, supra note 2, at 7.
67
Id.
68
Id. at 7–8.
62
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cause it allowed the record companies to sell songs originally written by musicians of color to members of the public and radio stations
that refused to buy or play records by African American artists.69
Pervasive social discrimination in the 1920s and beyond only
exacerbated the challenges to Black music artists.70 Record companies began to segment their markets along racial and social lines.71
“Race” records were those made by and for people of color, “hillbilly” or “old-time” records were made by and for white, rural
Americans from the South, and “popular” records were those made
for the general, white public.72 Companies often barred Black recording artists from recording other genres of music when they
deemed it did not fit within the corporate conceptions of Black music.73 From a socioeconomic perspective, the industry argues that the
endemic racism during this period resulted in these practices because it maximized the record labels’ profits.74 They were selling
exactly what the American audience wanted. Into the 1950s, the segregation of “Black” music became as much of a perpetuation of the
internalized, deeply-rooted racist assumptions of America as the
segregated schools and separate drinking fountains of the South, or
the restrictive housing covenants and discriminatory hiring practices
of the North.75
Why would a label pay fairly for the rights to use music recordings that the radio stations would not air?76 As inflation made the
two-cent statutory royalty rate less and less significant over time, the
overhead costs of mirror cover records decreased.77 And not only
did the profitability and feasibility of white “mirror covers” make it
an attractive practice for record labels, Robert Brauneis, Professor
69

Id. at 8.
See Greene, supra note 1, at 356–57.
71
Brauneis, supra note 2, at 5.
72
Id.
73
Id. (quoting KARL HAGSTROM MILLER, SEGREGATING SOUND: INVENTING
FOLK AND POP MUSIC IN THE AGE OF JIM CROW 188–89 (2010)).
74
See Brauneis, supra note 2, at 7; see also Greene, supra note 47, at 1184.
75
Brauneis, supra note 2, at 6 (quoting BRIAN WARD, JUST MY SOUL
RESPONDING: RHYTHM AND BLUES, BLACK CONSCIOUSNESS, AND RACE
RELATIONS 27 (1998)).
76
Id.
77
See id. at 20.
70
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and Co-Director of the Intellectual Property Law Program at George
Washington University Law School, suggests that the practice actively discouraged songwriting in the first place.78
Scholars also argue that the structural elements of copyright law
clash with the oral traditions of African American culture.79 Because
blues and jazz are primarily communicated through the oral tradition, blues and jazz musicians face another hurdle to protect their
creativity: the distinction between the composition and the sound
recording.80 While the 1976 Act affords protection to both the written composition and sound recordings of musical improvisations,81
the Ninth Circuit explains in Newton v. Diamond that if the owner
of the musical composition does not own the sound recording, he is
not protected when elements of the sound recording are sampled by
others if the sample is not reflected in the composition.82 In Newton,
flautist James W. Newton’s composition, “Choir,” was written in
the jazz tradition, so his score “does not contain indications for all
of the musical subtleties that it is assumed the performer-composer
of the work will make in the work’s performance.”83 Consequently,
Newton’s use of special techniques in his performance of “Choir”
78

See, e.g., id. at 30.
See Greene, supra note 1 at 356; Elizabeth L. Rosenblatt, Copyright’s OneWay Racial Appropriation Ratchet, 53 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 591, 601–02 (2019).
80
Under the 1976 Act, musical works are given two separate copyrights—
one for the composition and one for the sound recording. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2),
(7). The two copyrights can be, and often are, owned by different individuals or
entities.
81
See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (“Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with
this title, in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or
device.”).
82
See Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1194 (9th Cir. 2004) (“filtering
out” the licensed elements of the sound recording because plaintiff no longer
owned it). The Second Circuit also uses this approach. See, e.g., Poindexter v.
EMI Record Grp. Inc., No. 11 Civ. 559, 2012 WL 1027639, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar.
27, 2012) (citing Newton and filtering out elements unique to the sound recording
in an infringement claim because plaintiff owned rights only in composition);
Kelley v. Universal Music Grp., 14 Civ. 2968, 2016 WL 5720766, at *7 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 29, 2016) (dismissing plaintiffs’ sound recording infringement claim because they failed to plead beneficial ownership in sound recording).
83
Newton, 388 F.3d at 1194.
79
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went beyond the musical composition of “Choir.”84 Because copyright protection only extends to sounds when they are “fixed in a
tangible form,” only the owner of the sound recording—not Newton—could seek recovery for the use of any recorded sounds produced by Newton but not indicated in the score.85 Once the Newton
court determined that the defendant’s liability was limited to its use
of the composition separate and apart from the sound recording, the
writing was on the wall; the defendant won because its use of Newton’s composition was de minimis.86 Newton suggests that the language of section 114 of the 1976 Act preserves a domain of “style
of performance and the manner of interpretation” that can be freely
imitated through independent fixation.87 Therefore, the unwritten elements of recorded songs—instrumentation, the artistic decision to
rush or lag the beat, or instrumental or vocal timbre—are not protected elements of the composition.88
Sound recordings began displacing sheet music as the dominant
source of revenue as early as the 1920s89 and record labels have been
the principal means to “fix” the performance in a sound recording
because recording artists usually could not produce quality recordings themselves.90 Inevitably, as a condition of recording and promoting the record, record labels wielded their weighty bargaining
power to require ownership of the master recording of the artist’s

84

Id.
Id. Newton licensed all rights to the sound recording at issue in this case to
ECM Records, which in turn licensed its use to the defendant, the Beastie Boys,
for use in their song, “Pass the Mic.” Id. at 1191.
86
Id. at 1196.
87
Brauneis, supra note 2, at 22.
88
Rebecca Tushnet, professor of law at Harvard Law School, argues that the
mechanical license scheme, which was carried into the 1976 Act, encoded into
the law the notion that interpretive elements of musical performances are not
worth protecting against the kind of copying that would be actionable as applied
to books, scores, and the like. Rebecca Tushnet, Performance Anxiety: Copyright
Embodied and Disembodied, 60 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 209, 217 (2013).
89
Tuneen E. Chisholm, Whose Song Is That? Searching For Equity and Inspiration for Music Vocalists Under the Copyright Act, 19 YALE J.L. & TECH.
274, 305 (2017).
90
See id.
85
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songs.91 Today, with few exceptions,92 sound recordings of Black
artists’ songs are owned by the record company that recorded the
song.93 And record companies that control the rights to the sound
recording can control the use of the artist’s recorded performance
and retain the profit.
In sum, the copyright laws afford inadequate copyright protection to musicians of color and increase their inequality among the
rest of American society.94 Blues, jazz, and rock and roll developed
distinctly from African American roots95 but, because of the systemic exclusion of Black personnel from positions of power and the
segregation of Black audiences, this iconic American music was
popularized only when the white-dominated industry permitted it.96
Even in periods of relative popularity, Black musicians routinely
found their creativity exploited by publishers and recording studios.
And they are still subject to the effects of American racism.97 Moreover, Congress has not yet specifically addressed the fraud, greed,

91

See id.
Sam Cooke, Curtis Mayfield, Michael Jackson, and Prince are some major
Black artists who were wealthy or influential enough to buy back their music catalogues from the record labels or create their own. See Umazi Mvura, Black Music
Month Series: Ownership of Black Culture and Lives, AURN (June 25, 2019),
https://aurn.com/black-music-month-series-ownership-of-black-culture-andlives/.
93
While technological advancements have allowed more artists to self-produce their own albums with their own home-studio equipment, the need for promotional capital perpetuates the practice of heavily one-sided contracts between
a record label and an artist. See discussion infra Section IV.
94
Greene, supra note 1, at 374.
95
See id. at 353.
96
Reebee Garofalo, Professor Emeritus at University of Massachusetts Boston, refers to the pattern of Black innovation and white popularization as “black
roots, white fruits.” Reebee Garofalo, Crossing Over: From Black Rhythm &
Blues to White Rock ‘n’ Roll, in RHYTHM AND BUSINESS: THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF BLACK MUSIC, 112 (Norman Kelley, ed., 2002). Professor Garofalo
also notes that the Black “specialty fields” of music—blues, jazz, and gospel—
bore the brunt of cutbacks in record production during the World War II shellac
shortage. Once out of touch with the general public, the major record companies
never reabsorbed the Black music market. Id. at 117.
97
See Matt Stahl & Olufunmilayo Arewa, Denying Black Musicians Their
Royalties Has a History Emerging Out of Slavery, THE CONVERSATION (May 12,
92
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discrimination, and complacency that pervades this historical account in its copyright legislative process.98
II.

ORIGIN OF THE CASE ACT

A. Legislative History
The legislative history of the CASE Act began when then-Chairman of the former Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property, former Representative Lamar Smith, conducted a
hearing in 2006 to consider the need for new remedies to address
small copyright claims.99 At the hearing, Representative Smith
heard from several witnesses who testified that the cost of retaining
counsel and maintaining an action in federal court precluded many
artists whose works were clearly being infringed from vindicating
their rights.100 After the hearing, Representative Smith requested
that the Copyright Office conduct a study to assess “the extent to
which authors and other copyright owners are effectively prevented
from seeking relief from infringements due to constraints in the current system” and to furnish “specific recommendations, as appropriate, for changes in administrative, regulatory and statutory authority
that will improve the adjudication of small copyright claims and
thereby enable all copyright owners to more fully realize the promise of exclusive rights enshrined in our Constitution.”101

2021, 1:18 PM), https://theconversation.com/denying-black-musicians-their-royalties-has-a-history-emerging-out-of-slavery-144397 (“BMG found ‘significant’
racial disparities in royalty payouts to Black and racialized artists in four of its
labels.”).
98
See discussions supra Sections I.A, I.B.
99
Remedies for Small Copyright Claims: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Cts., the Internet, and Intell. Prop., 109th Cong. (2006) [hereinafter 2006 Hearing].
100
See id. at 4, 34 (statements of Paul Aiken, Exec. Dir., Authors Guild and
Victor A. Perlman, Gen. Couns. and Managing Dir., Am. Soc’y of Media Photographers, Inc.).
101
Letter from Rep. Lamar Smith, Chairman, House Judiciary Comm., to
Hon. Maria A. Pallante, Register of Copyrights (Oct. 11, 2011).
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Then-Register of Copyrights and Director Maria Pallante assembled a team of experts to conduct the study.102 In 2013, the Copyright Office published a report of their findings and recommendations.103 The Copyright Office Report examined several practical
and procedural issues with the current system of copyright enforcement, proposing solutions that both address the high-cost problem
and arguably stay within constitutional constraints.104
Regarding the failings of the current system, the Copyright Office acknowledged that the costs of litigating in the federal system
are completely disproportionate to the amount a claimant can expect
to recover in modest infringement cases and conveyed the frustration felt by copyright owners tasked with navigating the federal system’s complex procedural rules.105 Copyright cases present their
own specific challenges in federal litigation. For one, a plaintiff cannot bring a claim until the allegedly infringed domestic work is registered with the Copyright Office.106 Even if registered, a claimant
can only recover actual damages and profits for infringement—and
not statutory damages or attorney’s fees—if the infringement commenced before registration of an unpublished work or if the infringement commenced after the first publication of a work and the work
was not registered within three months after its first publication.107
Actual damages for infringement typically constitute the licensing
102

United States Copyright Off., Copyright Small Claims: A Report of the
Register of Copyrights (2013) [hereinafter Copyright Office Report].
103
Id.
104
Id. at i–iii.
105
Id. at 8–9. Litigants who proceed pro se in federal court, for example, generally face risks of inadvertently waiving or jeopardizing claims or defenses because they are less familiar with the law and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Id. at 12. The Copyright Office Report proceeds to describe the complexities at
every stage of litigation, from initiating a lawsuit in the correct forum and properly
serving defendants to the expense of discovery and motion practice. Id. at 12–14.
106
Id. at 16 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 411(a)). In March 2019, the Supreme Court
resolved the circuit disagreement as to what constitutes “registration” under the
statute, holding that “‘registration . . . has been made’ within the meaning of 17
U.S.C. § 411(a) not when an application for registration is filed, but when the
Register has registered a copyright after examining a properly filed application.”
Fourth Est. Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC, 139 S. Ct. 881, 892
(2019).
107
Copyright Office Report, supra note 102, at 17; 17 U.S.C. § 412.
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fee that artists would charge a client to use the work: between $300
to a few thousand dollars for illustrators and photographers, for example.108 Claimants who realize the importance of timely registration too late would have to pay a $760 fee to expedite the process if
they still can109 but, because individual authors and small firms do
not typically timely register their copyrights, commentators agree
that the registration requirement for statutory damages places
smaller entities at a disadvantage.110
The Copyright Office observed that claimants often face difficulties identifying the infringer in the internet age, especially when
the wrong-doer’s internet profile remains anonymous.111 To reveal
an anonymous online infringer’s identity, the claimant must subpoena the internet service provider to reveal the operator, a practice
that courts resist by construing the relevant Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”) provision narrowly.112 Once initiated, the
statute of limitations may bar an otherwise meritorious claim113 or
legally complex defenses, including fair use, DMCA safe harbor
provisions, applicability of statutory licenses, and exceptions for libraries and archives may make litigation prohibitively expensive.114
The Copyright Office Report suggested that, although most
graphic artists that suffer from infringement would likely win if they
brought a lawsuit, prohibitive costs and inherent difficulties of the
current system dissuade them.115 Using numbers from 2010, the
Copyright Office Report found that the median cost for a party to
litigate a copyright infringement lawsuit through to appeal with less
than $1 million at risk was $350,000 and, to reach the close of discovery, the median cost was $200,000.116 Therefore, in an arena
where pro se representation is virtually impossible and where most

108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116

Copyright Office Report, supra note 102, at 17 n.97.
Id.
Id. at 22.
Id. at 18.
Id. at 18–19 (citing multiple cases denying issuance of subpoena).
Id. at 19.
Id.
Id. at 26.
Id. at 25 (citing AIPLA, supra note 43, at 35).

2022]

THE HIGHER COST PROBLEM

233

copyright attorneys will not take low-value infringement cases, meritorious cases are often shut out of court.117
With respect to constitutional issues, the Report concluded that,
despite the Seventh Amendment entitlement to a jury trial on issues
pertinent to an award of statutory damages,118 the right to a jury trial
“is considered an individual right that can be relinquished.”119 The
Report also addressed the constitutionality of a legislatively-created
court adjudicating copyright claims by exploring Supreme Court decisions that employed a pragmatic approach to condone the creation
of administrative courts for matters involving “public rights,” especially when both parties consent to non-Article III processes.120 It
concluded that the public nature of the closely-tied rights and remedies of copyright owners to the national system of registration and
recordation—when combined with the empirical evidence that
many copyright cases could never be practically litigated in Article
III courts—rendered the threat of a voluntary small-claims proceeding to Article III courts minimal.121 Per the Report, a voluntary
small-claims court also makes jurisdictional Due Process concerns
moot because “if a nonresident defendant voluntarily submits to a
court’s jurisdiction, he or she waives any objection and personal jurisdiction is proper.”122
In its quest to find the best solution to the high-cost problem, the
Copyright Office held a roundtable discussion in May of 2012 where
industry representatives of the news media, authors, photographers,
songwriters, and publishers met with copyright scholars to discuss
117

Id. at 9.
See Feltner v. Columbia Pictures, Inc., 523 U.S. 340, 355 (1998).
119
Copyright Office Report, supra note 102, at 28 (citing several Supreme
Court and circuit decisions).
120
Id. at 29–39. The Copyright Office Report suggested that Executive Benefits Insurance Agency v. Arkinson, not yet decided when the Copyright Office
published its Report, could have an impact on Congress’s approach to an alternative process for small copyright claims. Id. at 38. But the Court’s decision quickly
dispensed petitioner’s claim, not deciding whether non-consent to a bankruptcy
proceeding entitled it to have an Article III court review the bankruptcy court’s
decision because, “[i]n effect, [petitioner] received exactly that” when the district
court conducted a de novo review and entered its own valid final judgment. Exec.
Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkinson, 573 U.S. 25, 39–40 (2014).
121
Copyright Office Report, supra note 102, at 41.
122
Id. at 46.
118
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the possible forms and functions of a copyright small-claims tribunal.123 Because copyright industries often have competing interests
in copyright, industry representatives, unsurprisingly, expressed
stark disagreements regarding the appropriate limit on damages, the
complexity of claims that would be suitable for the tribunal to hear,
how many small-claims courts should exist, whether the tribunal
should permit parties to hire attorneys, and whether a copyright
small-claims tribunal is constitutional.124 For example, while some
participants supported allowing only the most straightforward, noncomplex claims and disallowing claims where a respondent could
argue fair use as a defense, media representatives correctly pointed
out that such a restriction would bar almost every claim in their industry.125
The Copyright Office also held two-day public hearing events in
November 2012 at Columbia Law School in New York City and
UCLA School of Law in Los Angeles to address many broad topics
of concern that would arise from establishing a copyright smallclaims tribunal.126 Then in February 2013, the Copyright Office requested and received additional comments to focus on, among other
pertinent issues, whether the small-claims system should be voluntary or mandatory, what types of copyrighted works should be covered, and the types of claims that would be appropriate.127 The Copyright Office Report’s recommendations to Congress were distilled
from the views of the speakers at the May 2012 roundtable discussion, the November 2012 hearings, and the responses to the 2013
request for comments.128
123
See The George Washington Univ. L. Sch., Intellectual Property Event
Videos, http://www.law.gwu.edu/Academics/FocusAreas/IP/Pages/Videos.aspx.
Hyperlinks for videos of the proceedings are under the heading “The IP Small
Claims Roundtable, May 20, 2012.”
124
See GW Law, IP Small Claims Roundtable: Copyright Roundtable, Session 1, VIMEO (Aug. 27, 2012, 4:44 PM), https://vimeo.com/48324943.
125
Id.
126
Copyright Office Report, supra note 102, at 6.
127
Id. at 7.
128
See id. at 92–133 (citing to public hearing transcripts and roundtable videos
while discussing key findings and recommendations). The Copyright Office’s recommended policies and procedures generally reflected a consensus among multiple stakeholders. See id.
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The Copyright Office ultimately recommended that Congress
create a centralized tribunal within the Copyright Office to administer voluntary proceedings without requiring in-person appearances.129 The tribunal would have three adjudicators: two would
have significant experience in copyright law and one would have a
background in alternative dispute resolution.130 Per the recommendation, copyright owners must either have registered their works
with the Copyright Office or filed an application before bringing an
action and would be eligible to receive $15,000 in statutory damages
per registered work or $7,500 per work not registered by the normal
applicable deadline for statutory damages.131 Actual and statutory
damages would be capped at $30,000.132
The Copyright Office further recommended that claimants who
initiate a proceeding in the tribunal must provide notice to the responding parties who must agree to the process through an opt-out
system or through affirmative, written consent.133 Respondents
would assert all relevant defenses and limited counterclaims, including claims of misrepresentation; those threatened with an infringement action could seek a declaration of noninfringement.134 The Office recommended that once proceedings begin, no formal motion
practice would be allowed and discovery would be limited.135 The
tribunal’s determinations would bind only the parties and claims at
issue and have no precedential effect.136 The Copyright Office recommended limited administrative review for error and giving federal district courts power to ensure the enforceability of the tribunal’s determination and to remand a case for fraud, misconduct or
other improprieties.137
Notably, neither the May 2012 roundtable, the November 2012
public hearings, nor any submissions responsive to the February
2013 inquiry included any discussion of the historically adverse
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137

Id. at 4.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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consequences of copyright law toward people of color or how a
small-claims tribunal might affect this group.138 The Copyright Office and legislative hearings on the CASE Act before Congress similarly failed to consider how a small-claims tribunal might affect
people of color.
B. The CASE Act’s Structure and Provisions
The CASE Act, as passed, largely follows the legislative proposal set out in the Copyright Office Report.139 The passage of
CASE Act added chapter 15 to the Copyright Laws of United States
and provides definitions, establishes a Copyright Claims Board
(“CCB”); and outlines the CCB’s authority and duties, the nature of
small-claim proceedings, the requirements for registration of a copyrighted work, how proceedings shall be conducted, their effect on
the parties and nonparties, review and appeal procedures, stay procedures, Copyright Office implementation, and funding.140
The CCB now serves as the alternative forum in which parties
may seek resolution of certain copyright claims for any category of
copyrighted work.141 As recommended by the Copyright Office in
the Copyright Office Report, three copyright claims Officers, recommended by the Register of Copyrights and appointed by the Librarian of Congress, serve on the CCB for renewable and staggered
six-year terms; two of the Officers have “substantial” experience in
evaluation, litigation, or adjudication of copyright infringement
claims; and one has “substantial familiarity with copyright law and
experience in the field of alternative dispute resolution . . . .”142 The
CCB is staffed with at least two Copyright Claims Attorneys to assist in its administration.143 Copyright Claims Officers are tasked
with rendering determinations on claims brought before the CCB;
ensuring that the claims are properly asserted and appropriate for
resolution under the CCB; managing CCB proceedings and render-

138
139
140
141
142
143

See generally id.
Compare id. at 133–61, with 17 U.S.C. §§ 1501–1511.
§§ 1501–1511.
§ 1502(a).
§ 1502(b).
Id.
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ing rulings pertaining to claims, counterclaims, defenses, scheduling, discovery, evidentiary, and other matters; requesting relevant
documents from parties and nonparties; conducting hearings; facilitating settlement; awarding monetary and injunctive relief; providing information to the public; and maintaining records of the proceedings to provide as needed to the public.144 The Officers’ determinations must be based on the proceedings before it and in accordance with the United States’ Copyright Laws, judicial precedent,
and applicable regulations of the Register of Copyrights.145
Participation in a CCB proceeding is entirely voluntary146 and is
available for claims of infringement in a copyrighted work, claims
for a declaration of noninfringement, claims for misrepresentation
under the DMCA, and counterclaims arising under the same transactions, occurrences or in connection with an agreement that could
affect the relief awarded to the claimant.147
Claimants may elect at any time before a final determination is
rendered to recover actual damages and profits up to $30,000, or
statutory damages up to $15,000 for each work infringed, and
capped at $30,000.148 The Copyright Claims Officers cannot unilaterally require a respondent cease its infringing activity149 but may
consider the respondent’s agreement to cease the activity when
awarding actual or statutory damages.150 Parties to a CCB proceeding will bear their own fees and costs unless the case was brought or
defended in bad faith, in which case that party may be ordered to
pay up to $5,000 to the other party, or $2,500 if the other party appeared pro se.151 Unlike bringing a copyright action in federal court,
the CCB only requires that the owner of the allegedly infringed work
deliver a completed application for registration and the registration
fee before filing an action.152 But, for works not timely registered

144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152

§ 1503(a).
§ 1503(b)(1).
§ 1504(a).
§ 1504(c)(1)–(4).
§ 1504(e)(1)(A)–(B).
§ 1504(e)(2)(A).
§ 1504(e)(1)(A)(i), (ii)(IV).
§§ 1504(e)(3), 1506(y)(2).
§ 1505(a).
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under section 412, the CCB limits the maximum statutory award to
$7,500 per work infringed, for up to $15,000.153
CCB Officers follow the Register of Copyright’s regulations and
judicial precedent; when precedent conflicts, the CCB follows the
precedent of the federal jurisdiction that has the most significant ties
to the parties and conduct at issue.154 Claimants may proceed either
pro se, represented by an attorney, or represented by a qualified law
student on a pro bono basis.155 All claims and counterclaims are
screened by a Copyright Claims Attorney for compliance and either
instructed to proceed with service on the respondent or notified of
noncompliance and permitted up to two opportunities to amend the
claim.156 The CCB has discretion to dismiss any claim if it determines that a relevant issue of law or fact is too complex or outside
the subject matter competence of the CCB.157
Upon service of process, a respondent who fails to opt out within
sixty days loses the opportunity to have the dispute decided by an
Article III court, waives the right to a jury trial, and is bound by the
determination of the CCB proceeding.158 If a respondent fails to participate in the proceeding, the CCB may enter a default determination after requiring the claimant to submit evidence sufficient to support a finding in claimants favor.159
No motion practice is allowed in CCB proceedings, but the CCB
may allow parties to address relevant questions of fact or law.160
Discovery is limited to “relevant information and documents, written interrogatories, and written requests for admission,” but the CCB
153

§ 1504(e)(1)(A)(ii)(II).
§ 1506(a)(2).
155
§ 1506(d). The Copyright Office recently concluded its rulemaking phase
for the implementation of the CASE Act. The Copyright Office previously accepted comments to establish rules regarding active proceedings and evidence,
Copyright Claims Board: Active Proceedings and Evidence, 86 Fed. Reg. 69890
(Dec. 8, 2021), as well as eligibility requirements for representation by law students and of business entities, Copyright Claims Board: Representation by Law
Students and Business Entities, 86 Fed. Reg. 74394 (Dec. 30, 2021).
156
§ 1506(f)(1), (2).
157
See § 1506(f)(3).
158
§ 1506(g)(1), (i).
159
§ 1506(u).
160
§ 1506(m).
154
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may request the voluntary submission of documents from nonparties.161 Admissible evidence in CCB proceedings need not conform
with formal rules of evidence.162
After the CCB makes its final determination, a party may make
a request for reconsideration.163 If denied, the party may request review of the final determination by the Register of Copyrights, who
will only consider whether the CCB abused its discretion in denying
reconsideration.164 Final CCB determinations may be enforced by
applying to the appropriate federal district court for an order confirming the relief awarded by the CCB and reducing the award to a
judgment.165
III.

CRITICISM FROM SCHOLARS AND RESPONSES

A. Constitutionality of the Structure and Operation of the
Small-Claims Tribunal
Some are concerned that the structure and details of a smallclaims tribunal described by the CASE Act run afoul of Article III
courts’ exclusive jurisdiction.166 The Supreme Court has long held
that Article I does not give Congress the power to create tribunals
that adjudicate claims that can only be adjudicated by Article III
courts.167 But exceptions do exist. Recently, the Supreme Court narrowly held in Oils States Energy, LLC v. Greene’s Energy Group,
LLC that the grant of a patent is a matter of public rights and, therefore, inter partes review, or “a second look at an earlier administrative grant of a patent” by the legislatively created Patent Trial and
Appeal Board (“PTAB”) also falls on the public rights side of the
public-private divide.168 Professors Pamela Samuelson and Kathryn
161

§ 1506(n).
§ 1506(o).
163
§ 1506(w).
164
§ 1506(x).
165
§ 1508(a).
166
Pamela Samuelson & Kathryn Hashimoto, Scholarly Concerns About a
Proposed Copyright Small Claims Tribunal, 33 BERKELEY L.J. 689, 692 (2018).
167
Id.
168
Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct.
1365, 1379 (2018).
162
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Hashimoto suggest that the CCB’s power to adjudicate copyright
disputes presents a different and more challenging issue than the administrative review of patents because adjudicating infringement
claims is “exactly what Article III courts are supposed to do.”169
But several cases examining the constitutionality of non-Article
III courts give reason to believe voluntary participation in CCB proceedings are constitutional, even when adjudicating private disputes. In addition to ruling such administrative courts constitutional
in cases involving “public rights,”170 the Supreme Court later held
that disputes involving “private rights,” or the liability of one individual to another, may be assigned to non-Article III courts in contexts where Congress has broad authority over the subject matter,
such as in admiralty and maritime law.171 When the Court decided
that bankruptcy courts were unconstitutional in Northern Pipeline
Co. in 1982, most Justices did not join Justice Brennan’s opinion
that held that only territorial courts, military tribunals, and administrative courts examining matters of public rights were exempted
from Article III’s constraints, which left the door open for other exemptions.172 For example, in 1986, a majority of the Court held that
whether the parties consented to jurisdiction of the non-Article III
court was a significant factor in determining whether Article III permitted its use.173 And in 2015, the Court in Wellness International
169

Samuelson & Hashimoto, supra note 166, at 693.
See, e.g., Murray’s Lessee v. The Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59
U.S. 272, 284 (1855) (recognizing that Congress could withhold from Article III
courts certain matters involving “public rights”). The Supreme Court later confirmed in Northern Pipeline Const. Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co. that a public
right “at a minimum arise[s] ‘between the government and others.’” 458 U.S. 50,
69 (1982) (quoting Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 451 (1929)).
171
See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 53–54 (1932).
172
Northern Pipeline Co., 458 U.S. at 64, 66–69.
173
See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833,
849 (1986) (“[T]he relevance of concepts of waiver to Article III challenges is
demonstrated by our decision in Northern Pipeline, in which the absence of consent to an initial adjudication before a non-Article III tribunal was relied on as a
significant factor in determining that Article III forbade such adjudication.”);
Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 584 (1985) (“The
Court’s holding in [Northern Pipeline] establishes only that Congress may not
vest in a non-Article III court the power to adjudicate, render final judgment, and
issue binding orders in a traditional contract action arising under state law, without
170
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Network Ltd. v. Sharif held that, at least in bankruptcy cases, consent
need not be expressed by a respondent so long as it is “knowing and
voluntary.”174
The Constitution vests in Congress the express power to secure
authors’ and inventors’ exclusive rights to their writings and discoveries.175 To date, Congress has made exhaustive use of that power.
However, recognizing that its enacted laws do not effectively secure
those rights on their own, Congress enacted new legislation—the
CASE Act—to bolster their effectiveness.176 The plain language of
the IP Clause does not limit Congress to any particular means of
achieving that security so long as it promotes the progress of science
and the useful arts.177 Having shown that the IP Clause gives Congress broad discretion, Congress’s main obstacle is the extent to
which the determinations by the CCB conflict with Article III
courts’ ability to adjudicate.
As recognized by Schor, Thomas, and Wellness International
Network, the question of whether consent to allow non-Article III
tribunals to decide claims that would otherwise “impermissibly
threate[n] the institutional integrity of the Judicial Branch”178 must
be decided “not by ‘formalistic and unbending rules,’ but ‘with an
eye to the practical effect that the’ practice ‘will have on the constitutionally assigned role of the federal judiciary.’”179 In this regard,
Congress and others have extensively documented how the federal
court system has failed a specific class of copyright owners who,
because of the high costs of enforcing their rights, never bothered to
consent of the litigants, and subject only to ordinary appellate review.”) (emphasis
added).
174
Wellness Int’l Network Ltd., 575 U.S. 665, 683–85 (2015).
175
U.S. CONST. Art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
176
See supra Section II.A.
177
Some argue that the “by” portion of the IP Clause designates that “securing . . . to Authors and inventors . . . the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries” directs to Congress an exclusive means to accomplish the
purpose of “promot[ing] the Progress of Science and useful Arts.” See
WALTERSCHEID, supra note 13, at 156–65. But, even reading the IP Clause this
way, creating a tribunal to enforce, or “secure” the rights of authors and inventors
seems to squarely fit within this limitation.
178
Schor, 478 U.S. at 851.
179
Wellness Int’l Network Ltd., 575 U.S. at 678 (quoting Schor, 478 U.S. at
851).
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register their works with the Copyright Office and never filed lawsuits in Article III courts.180 As argued by the Copyright Office and
Sandra Aistars, Senior Fellow for Copyright Research and Policy at
George Mason University School of Law, the voluntariness of the
court and the de minimus impact on Article III courts allows the
small-claim court to overcome a jurisdictional challenge.181
B. Constitutionality of the Opt-Out Provision
Under the CASE Act, a respondent may simply “opt out” within
sixty days of receiving notice of a claim.182 When a respondent opts
out, the CCB will dismiss the proceeding,183 leaving claimants the
choice to face the risks of re-filing in a district court or forgoing their
claims.
The opt-out system serves an obvious jurisdictional purpose:
courts cannot exercise personal jurisdiction over parties who do not
meet the minimum Due Process standard required by the Fifth
Amendment.184 Eighteen scholars—specializing in economics, civil
procedure, and intellectual property—participated in a workshop
convened by the Berkeley Center for Law & Technology and the
UC Hastings College of Law in February 2017 to examine the effects of the small-claims tribunal.185 The workshop participants expressed that CCB’s assertion of nationwide personal jurisdiction,
service of process, and the opt-out system raises Due Process issues
because respondents who fail to opt out face a risk of default.186
Defenders of the opt-out system point to provisions of the Act
that make clear that participation in the tribunal is purely voluntary
and that the proceedings will be conducted “without the requirement
of in-person appearances by parties or others . . . .”187 Regarding the
180

See discussion supra Section I.A.
Copyright Office Report, supra note 102, at 41; Sandra M. Aistars, Ensuring Only Good Claims Come in Small Packages: A Response to Scholarly Concerns About a Proposed Small Copyright Claims Tribunal, 26 GEO. MASON L.
REV. 65, 75 (2018).
182
17 U.S.C. § 1506(i).
183
Id.
184
See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
185
Samuelson & Hashimoto, supra note 166, at 691.
186
Id. at 694–96.
187
See Aistars, supra note 181, at 77–78.
181
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degree of voluntariness of participation, “the true disagreement is
over whether defendants should be required to opt in or opt out of
the forum when properly served.”188 As an additional safeguard that
only meritorious judgments are issued, the CASE Act burdens the
plaintiff with showing sufficient evidence of infringement before the
CCB can issue a default judgment and then taking that judgment to
a federal district court to confirm relief.189
While service requirements satisfy Due Process concerns because they mirror the service requirements of Rule 4 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure,190 the CASE Act might impermissibly
limit the ability of an Article III court to review CCB determinations
of default judgments. Before entering a default judgment, the CCB
shall require the claimant to submit relevant evidence
and other information in support of the claimant’s
claim and any asserted damages and, upon review of
such evidence and any other requested submissions
from the claimant, shall determine whether the materials so submitted are sufficient to support a finding
in favor of the claimant under applicable law . . . .191
Then, if the evidence is sufficient,192 the CCB gives notice to the
respondent and thirty days to respond with opposing evidence or information.193 A respondent who still fails to respond after thirty days

188

Id. at 78.
Id. at 79; 17 U.S.C. §§ 1506(u)(1), 1508.
190
See Aistars, supra note 181, at 77–79. Compare 17 U.S.C. § 1506(g)(3)
(requiring service of process within ninety days by a person who is at least eighteen years old and not a party), with FED. R. CIV. P. 4(c) (requiring service of process within ninety days by a person who is at least eighteen years old and not a
party).
191
§ 1506(u)(1).
192
What the CCB regards as “sufficient” evidence and whether the threshold
amount of evidence required depends on the type of infringement remains to be
seen. Section 1506(s) instructs the CCB to use a preponderance of the evidence
standard to make factual findings, § 1506(s), but the sufficiency standard in
§ 1506(u)(1) probably only requires that the evidence supports a finding in favor
of the claimant, akin to an appellate-type review.
193
§ 1506(u)(2).
189
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and suffers a default judgment has another ninety days to ask a district court to vacate, modify, or correct the judgment upon a showing
that the default was entered due to excusable neglect.194
But, unlike the service of process rules, the CASE Act’s limited
bases by which a district court can vacate a default judgment are
narrower than those of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which
allow up to one year to challenge a final judgment for excusable
neglect195 and also allow relief from a default judgment for “good
cause”196 or any other justifiable reason.197 In proposing the limiting
“excusable neglect” language, the Copyright Office did not explain
the disparity between its rule and the broad latitude for relief allowed
by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in its Report—other than
arguing that its proposed mechanism for challenging default judgments “would provide a means to have the default determination reviewed and potentially set aside by an Article III judge, thus providing an additional safeguard for defaulting respondents.”198 But defaulting respondents may have reason to challenge the constitutionality of this provision because the “additional safeguard,” in reality,
offers less Due Process protection than the Federal Rules. In the case
of a CCB default determination, not every ground for relief enumerated in Rule 60(b) would apply; section 1508(c)(1)(C) harshly limits
the time a respondent may argue excusable neglect and does not protect defaulting respondents from mistakes by the CCB in assessing

194

§ 1508(c)(1)(C). Excusable neglect is
[a] failure — which the law will excuse — to take some proper
step at the proper time (esp. in neglecting to answer a lawsuit)
not because of the party’s own carelessness, inattention, or willful disregard of the court’s process, but because of some unexpected or unavoidable hindrance or accident or because of reliance on the care and vigilance of the party’s counsel or on a
promise made by the adverse party.
Neglect, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
195
FED. R. CIV. P. 60(c)(1).
196
Id. 55(c).
197
Id. 60(b)(6) (“[T]he court may relieve a party or its legal representative
from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for . . . any other reason that justifies
relief.”).
198
See Copyright Office Report, supra note 102, at 99.
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the sufficiency of the evidence submitted by the claimant or fraud
that the CCB fails to detect.199
Despite the limited ability to vacate default judgments, federal
courts presumably will refuse to confirm relief to a claimant if another exception applies under section 1508(c).200 The way federal
courts interpret section 1508(a) with respect to claimants’ petitions
to enforce default judgments therefore impacts whether the critics’
Due Process concerns are justified. Therefore, as the CASE Act
takes effect, we should monitor how often default judgments are entered—and enforced—against types of uses that do not infringe on
copyright holders’ rights.
C. Whether Steep Statutory Damages Squander the Act’s
Incentive-Based Approach
Some criticize the use of the relatively small statutory damage
cap in the context of a voluntary small-claims tribunal.201 Damages
for claims brought to the CCB are capped at $30,000.202 In most
cases, this figure is only a fraction of what a plaintiff could expect
to receive in federal court,203 but some fear that they are not low

199

See § 1508(c)(1)(C).
See § 1508(a). Federal courts will not enforce CCB judgments if “the determination was issued as a result of fraud, corruption, misrepresentation, or other
misconduct,” or “[i]f the Copyright Claims Board exceeded its authority or failed
to render a final determination concerning the subject matter at issue.”
§ 1508(c)(1), (2).
201
See Samuelson & Hashimoto, supra note 166, at 703–04; Ben Depoorter,
If You Build It, They Will Come: The Promises and Pitfalls of a Copyright Small
Claims Process, 33 BERKELEY L.J. 711, 713–14 (2019). Professor Samuelson has
long supported reforming the federal copyright system to reduce the statutory
damages cap. See generally Pamela Samuelson & Tara Wheatland, Statutory
Damages in Copyright Law: A Remedy in Need of Reform, 51 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 439, 480–91 (2009) (arguing that some statutory damage awards are inconsistent with congressional intent and Due Process).
202
17 U.S.C. § 1504(e).
203
“In a case where the copyright owner sustains the burden of proving, and
the court finds, that infringement was committed willfully, the court in its discretion may increase the award of statutory damages to a sum of not more than
$150,000.” 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2).
200
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enough to convince a respondent to litigate before the CCB.204 They
suggest that statutory damages in the tribunal should either be much
lower205 or that the CCB be restricted to award only compensatory
damages.206 The compensatory-damages-only attitude has been described by others as “so extreme that it draws into question the credibility of the remainder of the critique.”207 The compensatory-damages-only model would incentivize infringers to avoid paying license fees and wait to see whether they ever get caught.208
A statutory damages cap should reflect the limited discovery and
streamlined proceedings of a small claims process. A higher limit
would make it more likely that the responding party would refuse
the small claims process, preferring the full range of discovery and
motion practice allowed in federal court, and too low of a cap would
shortchange copyright owners and offer little deterrent effect to potential infringers.209 Whether the statutory damages cap is too high,
however, may depend on industry-specific factors. For example,
photographers, who are less likely to be represented by rights-enforcing organizations than musicians, generally advocated for a
higher statutory cap or no cap.210 Music industry representatives, by
contrast, suggested that the cap should be lower, endorsing the idea
that a higher amount would encourage more respondent opt outs.211
The Copyright Office noted that “[i]t is important to consider carefully the proper claim amount because any voluntary process must

204

Samuelson & Hashimoto, supra note 166, at 704; Depoorter, supra note
201, at 713–14.
205
Depoorter, supra note 201, at 728.
206
Samuelson & Hashimoto, supra note 166, at 697.
207
Aistars, supra note 181, at 80.
208
Id.
209
Copyright Office Report, supra note 102, at 109.
210
See, e.g., Transcript of proceedings at 140:24–145:15, In re: Small Copyright Claims Public Hearing (Nov. 15, 2012) [hereinafter Nov. 15, 2012 Public
Hearing] (suggesting that, in photography, limiting statutory damages would dramatically reduce the effectiveness of an alternative claims tribunal). Ironically,
photographers routinely forgo registration of the thousands of images they produce, which if then untimely registered, would cut the statutory damages available
to them in the small claims court in half. 17 U.S.C. § 1504(e)(1)(A)(ii)(II).
211
Nov. 15, 2012 Public Hearing, supra note 210.

2022]

THE HIGHER COST PROBLEM

247

provide sufficient ability for claimants to redress typical infringements while also incentivizing respondents to participate.”212 Yet,
the Copyright Office summarily recommended, and Congress later
adopted, one cap for all types of works and industries.213
Finding the appropriate damage cap does not have a one-sizefits-all solution. To ensure that potential respondents have the optimal incentive to use the CCB, Congress should quickly amend this
provision of the CASE Act to better reflect industry-specific needs
with respect to statutory damages. This would most likely require
different statutory caps depending on the type of work infringed.
The Copyright Office Report itself contains enough opinions from
copyright stakeholders to gauge the appropriate cap for a variety of
types of works.214 A claim for the infringing use of a photograph,
for example, would be better suited for a higher cap than the infringing use of a sound recording.
D. The Implicit Precedence of Non-Precedential Copyright
Claims Board Decisions
The CASE Act provides that decisions by the CCB hold no precedential weight in any other action before any other court, including
the CCB itself.215 With almost universal agreement from copyright
stakeholders, the Copyright Office Report reasoned that “[b]ecause
the small claims tribunal would rely on abbreviated procedures, including limited discovery and argument, it would be inappropriate
for its decisions to be binding beyond the particular parties and disputes it adjudicates.”216 However, because Board decisions will be
available to the public,217 one concern is that CCB holdings may
nonetheless influence longstanding copyright doctrine, as these “abbreviated procedures” could shift the focus from what federal courts
traditionally emphasize to what the Copyright Claims Officers may

212

Copyright Office Report, supra note 102, at 109.
Id. at 110.
214
See id. at 110–12.
215
17 U.S.C. § 1507(a)(3).
216
Copyright Office Report, supra note 102, at 130.
217
§ 1506(t)(3) (“Each final determination of the Copyright Claims Board
shall be made available on a publicly accessible website.”).
213
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feel is important.218 After all, two of the Board’s three adjudicating
Officers will be appointed because they have substantial experience
working with infringement claims.219 In response to this concern,
critics suggested in 2018 that periodic audits of CCB decisions
would minimize the possibility of systemic bias in the small-claims
system.220 Scholars also suggest that the CCB should at least be able
to refer to its prior rulings when it determines that a work alleged to
be infringed had entered the public domain.221
With respect to auditing a CCB Officer’s decisions for conformity with copyright jurisprudence, the “Performance Appraisal” provision of the CASE Act does allow a review of the CCB Officer
performance, so long as the Register of Copyrights or the Librarian
of Congress does not assess performance of the Officers based on
the substantive result of any individual determination reached by the
Board.222 So, by implication, an appraisal may consider whether an
Officer generally tends to issue decisions that are biased or unfaithful to federal precedent.
But the CASE Act does not require that performance appraisals
be conducted on a regular basis, or at all.223 Curiously, the same individual who recommends the Officers for appointment, the Register of Copyrights, would likely be the individual conducting performance appraisals if they occur.224 To the extent that Congress intends this provision as oversight, the Register of Copyrights should
not appraise the performance of the Officers he or she recommends
to avoid even a hint of impropriety. Regardless, this appraisal is not
the audit suggested by Samuelson and Hashimoto because it “may
not consider the substantive result of any individual determination
reached by the Copyright Claims Board . . . except to the extent that
the result may relate to any actual or alleged violation of an ethical

218

See generally Samuelson & Hashimoto, supra note 166, at 708.
§ 1502(b)(3).
220
See Samuelson & Hashimoto, supra note 166, at 702–03.
221
Id. at 702 n.49.
222
§ 1503(b)(3) (emphasis added).
223
Id.
224
See § 1503(c) (“Subject to subsection (b), the Copyright Claims Officers
and Copyright Claims Attorneys shall, in the administration of their duties, be
under the general direction of the Register of Copyrights.”).
219
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standard of conduct.”225 The CASE Act’s only mechanism to keep
the CCB honest to federal precedent, therefore, is the losing parties’
burden to challenge its rulings through the limited appeals process.226
There is some merit to the argument that the CCB should be permitted to use its prior rulings about whether a work is in the public
domain: this reliance will save time and effort. But, the Board will
often base its decisions on limited evidence and argument.227 So, if
the Board could decide to rely on its own prior rulings, then any nonrelated party could challenge preclusion on Due Process grounds
and, if a party to a current action opposing preclusion was also a
party to the prior proceeding, that party could nearly always assert
that the informal nature of the prior proceeding meant that it did not
have a full and fair opportunity to be heard. Allowing prior precedent in this way, therefore, will add operative costs because the CCB
would have to set hearings and otherwise take time to determine
whether issue preclusion applies to each proceeding in which it is
asserted.
E. Inequitable Use of the Copyright Claims Board
Though Congress intends that the CASE Act will allow the sympathetic, independent creators in all industries to remedy infringement,228 some predict that the small-claims process will be more
useful to some industries than others. In fact, when the Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property convened for
the first time in 2006 to discuss the low-value copyright suit problem, Jenny Toomey, the Executive Director of the Future of Music
Coalition, suggested that it was unclear whether changing the current copyright laws to address the infringement issue would benefit
musicians at all.229 A handful of America’s largest music publishing,
licensing, and performing rights organizations submitted a comment
225

§ 1503(b)(3); Samuelson & Hashimoto, supra note 166, at 702–03.
See § 1503(g).
227
See discussion supra Section II.B.
228
2018 Hearing, supra note 43, at 1 (statement of Rep. Goodlatte, Chairman,
H. Comm. on the Judiciary).
229
2006 Hearing, supra note 99, at 21–22 (statement of Jenny Toomey, Exec.
Dir., Future of Music Coal.).
226
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to the Copyright Office in 2013 explaining that the music industry
does not need a small claims tribunal because “even the most basic
copyright cases frequently require nuanced consideration of key elements of authorship, ownership, copying, and damages assessments” that are “not typically part of the small claims court dynamic.”230 And by 2017, the focus seemed to have shifted away from
musicians’ use of the small claims system and more toward the benefits that the CASE Act will bring to visual artists.231
Another concern is that corporate owners and assignees, rather
than the sympathetic creator, will overuse the small-claims process
by “buying up small claims and seeking excessive damages before
Tribunal panels.”232 But, according to Sandra Aistars, corporate entities and assignees also include
photography studios, bands (which are often incorporated and may take assignments of copyrights such
as of the sound recordings of their members), independent filmmakers (who likewise frequently operate through individually owned production companies and must be work-for-hire owners of various elements of the film to effectively distribute it), indie
musician-owned labels, and “mom and pop” book
and music publishers (who may be self-publishing
through a family business).233
Aistars suggests that a sliding scale for filing fees based on the
size of the claim would better discourage major corporate plaintiffs
from abusing the system.234
A question to be answered is whether and to what extent it matters that some industries would make more use of the CCB than others. So long as the target claimants use the small claims process to
some degree, more use by one industry over the other only shows its
See Nat’l Music Publishers’ Ass’n et al., Comments in Response to February 23, 2013 Notice of Inquiry (Apr. 12, 2013), https://www.copyright.gov/docs/smallclaims/comments/noi_02263013/NMPA.pdf.
231
2018 Hearing, supra note 43, at 2 (statement of Rep. Goodlatte, Chairman,
H. Comm. on the Judiciary).
232
Samuelson & Hashimoto, supra note 166, at 703.
233
Aistars, supra note 181, at 81.
234
Id.
230
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relative usefulness between different types of creators at a moment
in time. Industries’ priorities shift as new legislation and technology
impacts their current practices and business models. Whether the issue of copyright remedies is a higher priority for musicians now than
it was in 2006, or if it will ever in the future does not matter. What
matters is that a remedy for infringement exists should it be needed.
F. Upsetting the Balance of Works in the Public Domain
The 1909 Act’s continued formalities and the limited term of
protection resulted in a vast public domain.235 The 1976 Act, by extending the copyright term and abolishing the ability to renew, protected more works but still largely left the balance of protected
works versus works in the public domain relatively free from public
criticism.236 Some may feel that the CASE Act will place too much
emphasis on the rights of the copyright holder, thereby upsetting the
balance of protected works versus works that end up in the public
domain. But a model that relies on ignorance should raise red flags.
As discussed above, the inability to follow the complexities of the
copyright formalities in the twentieth century often resulted in the
appropriation of Black creativity.237 Luckily, the work of scholars
like Professors ReeBee Garofalo,238 K.J. Greene,239 and Robert
Brauneis240 makes turning a blind eye toward the injustices to Black
artists increasingly difficult. A rich public domain is valuable to
American culture because it fuels creativity in new works, but it cannot exist at the expense of any one group.
Perhaps such critics of the shrinking public domain can focus
their frustration on the bigger, albeit more difficult, targets. Since
America’s founding, it is no coincidence that every copyright law

235

See discussion supra Sections I.A, I.B.
See id.
237
See discussion supra Section I.B.
238
Garofalo, supra note 96, at 112–37.
239
See Greene, supra note 1, at 372–73 (discussing four patterns that have
resulted in inadequate intellectual property protection for Black music artists).
240
See Brauneis, supra note 2, at 24 (describing how the lack of knowledge
and bargaining power allowed African Americans to be uncompensated or undercompensated for publishing rights).
236
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has lengthened the term of copyright protection.241 In 1998, for example, Congress passed the “Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act,” extending the copyright term for twenty years to protect
Disney’s “limited” monopoly on its most well-known icon.242 One
could argue that an increased term of copyright protection should
result in increased incentive to create. But, using the recording industry as a test case, Professor Glynn Lunney used empirical research to conclude that more incentives did not lead to more and
better music.243 Professor Elizabeth Rosenblatt challenges Lunney’s
broad conclusion, suggesting that copyright’s incentives can still
provide opportunities for less-resourced creators to “stand on equal
footing, or at least more equal footing, with their better-resourced
counterparts.”244
Though American society benefits from a rich public domain, a
public domain fashioned from unequal bargaining power, differences in class, and level of education does more harm than good
from a social justice perspective. Reducing the term of copyright
protection to an optimal length, therefore, would still incentivize the
creation of new works and create room for Congress to help the lessresourced “stand on equal footing” by, for example, considering the
241
See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Copyright’s Excess Revisited, TEX. A&M UNIV.
J. PROP. LAW (forthcoming) (manuscript at 1) (available at
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3468213).
242
See Greene, supra note 47, at 1223 n.282; see generally Timothy B. Lee,
15 Years Ago, Congress Kept Mickey Mouse Out of the Public Domain. Will They
Do It Again?, WASH. POST (Oct. 25, 2013, 9:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2013/10/25/15-years-ago-congress-keptmickey-mouse-out-of-the-public-domain-will-they-do-it-again/.
243
Lunney, supra note 239, at 3, 11 (finding that copyright’s incentive based
approach “fail[s] at encouraging additional works at the margins[] and . . . force[s]
consumers to overpay for the most popular works”). To define “better” music,
Professor Lunney applied an exponential decay function to model the age-based
decline in popularity of a song after its initial release, then subtracted a predicted
total stream count from the actual Spotify stream count each year. The resulting
data shows whether the popularity of music released in a particular year declined
more quickly or slowly than other years. Id. at 7–8. Professor Lunney posits that
music released in years that showed a slower decline over time was “better” music. Id.
244
See Elizabeth L. Rosenblatt, Social Justice and Copyright’s Excess, 6 TEX.
A&M J. PROP. L. 5, 15 (2020).
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impact of copyright legislation on historically disadvantaged
groups.
IV.

EFFECTS OF THE CASE ACT ON THE MUSIC INDUSTRY AND
MUSICIANS OF COLOR
As previously discussed, the CASE Act initially was not seen as
legislation that would even be helpful to musicians.245 In the 2006
hearing, music representatives indicated a handful of other issues
that musicians face, such as public performance rights, copyright reversion, media ownership, and net neutrality246–some of which have
since been addressed by legislation like the Music Modernization
Act (“MMA”).247
In part, the MMA replaced the existing song licensing system
with a blanket license system, simplifying the licensing process.248
Digital music providers report streaming and download data to a
“mechanical licensing collective” that maintains a musical works
database, collects royalties from the digital music providers and distributes them to identified rights holders.249 The MMA repealed section 114(i), instead providing that in royalty rate disputes, the parties
can present evidence of the rates of other voluntary license agreements.250 Title III of the MMA also allows music producers, mixers,
and sound engineers to receive royalties for uses of sounds recordings on satellite and online radio.251 Supporters of the MMA believe
it will incentivize the creation of new works because it modernizes
the royalty payment system to pay each musician and rights holder
the amount they deserve, rather than only rewarding music artists
and professionals who have “made it.”252
245

See discussion supra Section II.A.
2006 Hearing, supra note 99, at 22 (2006) (statement of Jenny Toomey,
Exec. Dir., Future of Music Coal.).
247
Orrin G. Hatch-Bob Goodlatte Music Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 115264, 132 Stat. 3676 (2018).
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Id. at 3677.
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Id. at 3687.
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Id. at 3723–24.
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Id. at 3739.
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The CASE Act will allow copyright holders of musical works to
enforce rights under the MMA at a fraction of the cost of a federal
lawsuit.253 Artists of all socio-economic backgrounds can take advantage of the MMA’s music streaming reporting requirements because they make calculating actual damages a simple task once the
CCB finds infringement.
As a natural consequence, however, artists who produce music
that involves using samples, like hip-hop and rap, may receive more
summons by the owners of the unauthorized samples that artist incorporated into his or her track.254 Those artists can either respond
by opting out, participating in a CCB proceeding, or risk default by
ignoring the notice. In most cases, most artists would opt out. In
some cases, the likelihood of a federal suit might induce the alleged
infringing artist to offer licensing fees or otherwise settle. But in all
cases, whatever results from more copyright litigation before the
CCB pales in comparison to the larger, looming copyright concerns.
Looking at the bigger picture, copyright law historically enabled
the disparate treatment of musicians of color, from record labels that
underpaid and sold “mirror cover” recordings to the modern trend
of label-owned sound recordings.255 Scholars acknowledge that
America’s copyright system aggravates social and distributive injustice256 but disagree on whether copyright can be used as an effective tool to promote social justice.257 While K.J. Greene believes that
https://creedon.com/blog/2019/12/4/the-music-modernization-act-supportingmusic-artists-3-steps-at-a-time.
253
Because the small-claims tribunal’s purpose is to facilitate expedited,
lower-cost suits, the CCB may decide that some cases involving areas of complex
copyright law, such as ownership of a work, be limited to only address the infringement claim at hand. See Copyright Office Report, supra note 102, at 104
(recommending that the CCB be confined to non-complex copyright cases); 17
U.S.C. § 1503(f)(3).
254
Rosenblatt, supra note 244, at 20–21(“Sampling, a predominantly AfricanAmerican musical technique, faces greater legal challenge and encumbrance than
equivalent remix techniques carried out by the predominantly white creators of
mashups and electronic dance music.”).
255
See discussion supra Section I.B.
256
See, e.g., Rosenblatt, supra note 244, at 6–9 (describing how copyright law
tends to favor corporate interests at the expense of individuals).
257
Compare id. at 19 (“[C]opyright may not act as the tool for social justice
that some might hope it could.”), with Greene, supra note 46, at 385 (“IP itself is
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“IP can be re-engineered to bring about results of distributive justice
and to foster norms of racial and gender equality,”258 Elizabeth Rosenblatt argues that increased copyright effectiveness would not necessarily make exploitive record deals any less exploitive259 and that
“copyright law will naturally develop to benefit music corporations
over artists, and especially over minority artists, because music corporations represent a more consolidated interest group.”260 If the
CASE Act can lead to a more equitable society, therefore, its passage must suggest a lasting shift in congressional focus to the needs
of those most adversely affected by the current copyright system.
As to the practice of exploitative record deals, the solution lies
in encouraging affirmative efforts to increase copyright literacy
among artists on the one hand and public condemnation of one-sided
contracts between artists and labels on the other. Marginalized
groups that know the ins and outs of the copyright laws will be
harder to swindle;261 the prospect of bringing low-cost copyright
claims will help bring awareness of copyright law to under-resourced groups. Already, forum-based websites are full of discussions about copyright infringement, and many organizations, such
as the Copyright Society of the USA, provide and disseminate accurate information about every aspect of copyright law.262
Very few studies exist that survey Americans’ copyright literacy, but the available research shows Americans still have widely
held misconceptions about copyright law.263 Perhaps allowing
claimants to represent themselves will cause more harm than good
when the floodgates first open. However, the new opportunities to
in a period of analytical and practical turbulence, and a focus on critical perspectives can be invaluable to re-imagining an IP system that actually provides real
incentives to artists at the bottom of society, rather than multi-national conglomerates concentrated across IP industries.”).
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enforce copyright small claims combined with the efforts of rights
groups sharing educational materials about copyright law will substantially increase public knowledge.
But even the knowledge that the record labels’ contracts are unfair does not mean that artists will not sign them. As improving technology enables professional-quality home recordings and distribution at lower cost, the need to be seen and discovered amid the noise
of thousands of other home artists still makes signing with a label
an attractive option.264 The relief the CASE Act provides, by itself,
does not even marginally help level the playing field with respect to
the relative bargaining power of the music label and the individual—
mostly because that was not the main problem the CASE Act meant
to address. Copyright reform alone cannot resolve the inequitable
nature of pro-corporate power dynamics writ large. Instead, public
figures and rights organizations have the onus to educate the public
and assert pressure on labels to change their business practices. Celebrity music giants like Kanye West, for example, recently took to
Twitter to bring awareness to the disadvantages faced by artists who
do not own their own master recordings.265 Taylor Swift also very
publicly announced via several news outlets that she rerecorded her
songs because she could not buy back her master recordings and
thinks that artists deserve to own their work.266
Copyright law may not be well suited to fully address larger societal failures, but the CASE Act is still a positive legislative development because historically disadvantaged groups have a more
practical path toward protecting their intellectual property. Though
beyond the scope of this Note, more and better copyright legislation
is overdue. Congress should granularly assess the 1976 Act’s rework
provisions that led to the most confusion in the courts. Even more,
disadvantaged groups deserve a more certain path to enforcement
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than hoping that infringers voluntarily participate in CCB proceedings.
CONCLUSION
Congress’ observed need to construct a small-claims system reveals that the industry-negotiated compromises in past legislative
processes created the high-cost problem and keeps most small copyright claims out of court. An unintended consequence: the industryspecific provisions reflected in the 1909 Act—such as the compulsory license regime—adversely affected Black musicians as the music industry appropriated their creative output.267 The 1976 Act
granted additional protections in sound recordings, but the music
composition and sound recording dichotomy still permitted exploitation of musicians who could not afford to produce high quality
recordings themselves.268
That said, the legislative history of the CASE Act possibly signals a much-needed shift in congressional focus in future legislation
toward addressing the high costs of copyright litigation. While the
complex provisions of the CASE Act itself might seem excessive,
such complexity is needed to address the rest of Title 17 and prevent
a loophole that could lead to abuse. While the CASE Act will allow
more musicians to enforce their copyrights, it will not solve the incidence of racism in the music business or the prevalence of unfair
contracts between labels and artists. However, the new availability
of a small-claims court should increase copyright literacy and, when
combined with public pressure, may lead to a change in record labels’ business practices.
Finally, the CASE Act does ultimately serve to the purpose of
the IP Clause with respect to musical works because, in combination
with the MMA, the availability of bringing a claim under the CASE
Act for damages in the event of infringement should incentivize musicians’ creative output.269
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